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When is an Attorney's Breach




Within the last thirty years, Missouri plaintiffs and courts have broadened
liability exposure for attorneys to allow causes of action for fraud, breach of
contract, libel, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, loss of consortium,
and other causes of action in tort.2 This diverse array of claims has generated
confusion about when attorney misconduct constitutes legal malpractice and
when it does not.3 In 1995, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed this issue
with respect to one cause of action, breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty, in
Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C.4 In Donahue, the court said that
when breach of fiduciary duty was the result of an attorney's negligent
performance of professional services, the breach was solely a claim for legal
malpractice.5 The holding in Donahue led some courts to conclude that breach
of fiduciary duty was merely a claim for legal malpractice.6
In Klemme v. Best, the Missouri Supreme Court confronted
misinterpretations of its Donahue holding.7 The court stated that a breach of
fiduciary duty, independent of any legal malpractice, was actionable as a
separate tort.8 The Klemme court pushed apart the separate causes of action by
defining legal malpractice as founded on an attorney's duty to exercise due care9
and defining fiduciary duty as additional obligations of undivided loyalty and
confidentiality. 0 In Klemme, the supreme court thus established that, in
Missouri, even if an attorney breaches his fiduciary obligations towards a client,
that attorney may not have been negligent.
1. 941 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1997).
2. Francis M. Hanna & William C. Ruggiero, Legal Malpractice Litigation in
Missouri, 48 J. Mo. B. 97, 97 (1992).
3. See infra Section III.
4. 900 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1995).
5. Id.
6. Williams v. Preman, 911 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Klemme v. Best, No.
WD51503, 1996 WL 93540 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1996).
7. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 495. The court includes an attorney's duty to honor express contract
commitments in the second element of malpractice.
10. Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Police officer Byron Klemme (Klemme) sued Robert Best (Best), an
attorney who was hired to defend the City of Columbia," Klemme, and six other
police officers in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed by the parents of Kimberly
Linzie. Linzie was a nineteen-year-old girl who was shot and killed by
Columbia police in July 1985.' 3 Prior to settlement of the Section 1983 suit, the
Linzies filed a motion to dismiss Klemme as a defendant because the facts of the
case did not support a claim against him. 4 Klemme subsequently brought a
claim for malicious prosecution in the Circuit Court of Cole County against
Linzie's parents and, in an amended petition, against Best for breach of fiduciary
duty and constructive fraud.'"
Klemme alleged that when Best was retained by the city's self-insured
municipal association (Missouri Intergovernmental Risk Management
Association, or "MIRMA") to represent the city in the Section 1983 suit, he
assumed representation of all defendants in the Linzie litigation.'6 Klemme's
petition alleged that an official investigation had revealed that Klemme was not
present at the time of the Linzie shooting and that Best knew Klemme was not
involved. 7 The petition further alleged that when opposing counsel presented
a draft copy of the Section 1983 complaint naming Klemme as a defendant, Best
failed to assert that Klemme was not present at the time of the shooting.'
Klemme alleged that because Best did tell the Linzies' counsel that another
police officer, Otto Earnhart, was not involved in the shooting, Earnhart was
eliminated as a defendant in the final complaint.' Klemme alleged that Best
breached his fiduciary duty to Klemme because Best's failure to eliminate him
as a defendant was deliberate and intentional and placed the interests of the City
of Columbia and MIRMA above those of Klemme.2"
Best and his firm, Watson & Marshall, L.C., filed a motion to dismiss
Klemme's claim, contending that Klemme's petition for breach of fiduciary duty
and constructive fraud failed to state a cause of action2' and that such claims
11. Id. at 495.
12. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1997).
13. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 494-95.
14. Id. at 495.
15. Id.
16. Klemme v. Best, No. WD51053, 1996 WL 93540, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar.
5, 1996).
17. Id.
18. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 495.
19. Klemme, 1996 WL 93540, at *1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *2.
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were barred by the statute of limitations.22 In stating its reasons for dismissing
Best and Watson & Marshall from Klemme's petition, the trial court said,
"[P]laintiff has failed to allege facts which, if true, would make a submissible
case against these defendants under any recognized theory of Missouri law."'
The court also found that the factual allegations in Klemme's petition showed
that, on their face, the claims against Best and Watson & Marshall were barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.24
Klemme appealed dismissal of his claim to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District.25 That court concluded that Klemme had failed to state a cause
of action for either breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud because
Donahue and a case based on the holding in Donahue, Williams v. Preman,.6 had
rejected these as separate torts in a suit for damages against an attorney.'
Applying Donahue in Williams v. Preman, the court stated, "an attorney's
breach of duty to a client during the course of representation of the client is legal
malpractice, not breach of fiduciary duty as a separate tort. '28 The appellate
court found that Klemme failed to state a cause of action for either breach of
fiduciary duty or constructive fraud but did not reach whether Klemme had
failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice because the court concluded
this claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 9 After the opinion
by the appellate court, the Missouri Supreme Court accepted transfer.30
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court
because the applicable statute of limitations barred Klemme's claim.3' The court
disagreed, however, with the determinations of both lower courts that Klemme
had failed to state a cause of action.32 The court stated, "Klemme has alleged
facts that constitute the tort of breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud
against his attorney."33 Labeling the district court's interpretation of Donahue
as incorrect,3 4 the supreme court stated that clients can sue their attorneys for
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1994).
23. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. 1997).
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1994). See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying
text.
25. Klemme, 1996 WL 93540, at *1.
26. 911 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
27. Klemme, 1996 WL 93540, at *4.
28. Klemme, 1996 WL 93540, at *3 (citing Williams, 911 S.W.2d at 301).
29. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.020(4) (1994); Klemme, 1996 WL 93450, at *4. See
infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
30. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 83.03; Kiemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d.
493, 494 (Mo. 1997).
31. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 497.
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torts other than legal malpractice.?5 The court's holding can be expressed as
establishing two guidelines: (1) when the alleged breach can be characterized as
both a breach of the standard of care (legal malpractice based on negligence) and
a breach of a fiduciary obligation (constructive fraud), then the sole claim is
legal malpractice; and (2) when the alleged breach is characterized as a breach
of fiduciary duty, independent of legal malpractice, the separate claim of breach
of fiduciary duty is actionable as a separate tort.36
iL. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the line in Missouri between legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty as causes of action has been blurred. Some courts and scholars
have described the claims as distinct while others have classified breach of
fiduciary duty as a form of legal malpractice.37
A. Legal Malpractice
In Missouri, the four elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) an
attorney-client relationship existed; (2) the defendant acted negligently or in
breach of contract; (3) such acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
damages; and (4) but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would have been
successful in prosecution of the underlying claim.38
Definition of the first element, the attorney-client relationship, is well
settled. This relationship is satisfied when a client engages counsel39 through
a formal or informal contract and an undertaking is implied, or is created by
compensation of a third party, dual representation, or volunteering.4 Missouri
courts have both narrowly and broadly construed this relationship. In Rose v.
Summers, for example, the Eastern District Court of Appeals refused to extend
the attorney-client relationship to individual limited partners in a limited
partnership because the partnership, not individual partners, had hired the
attorney.4' In Donahue, however, the Missouri Supreme Court brought the state
in line with current trends for third party beneficiary liability42 by extending the
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hanna, supra note 2, at 98.
38. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo.
1995); Boatright v. Shaw, 804 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
39. Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 683, 685
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
40. See I RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.2,
at 491-93 (4th ed. 1996).
41. lId.
42. Daniel J. Reed, Professional Liability Update, 51 J. Mo. B. 177, 177 (1995)
(explaining that the court was inconsistent with current trend).
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attorney-client relationship to intended beneficiaries of attempted testamentary
transfers. a3 The court established a six-factor balancing test to determine when
the legal duty of an attorney to a non-client exists.'
The second element of legal malpractice, negligence by the attorney, is not
as well settled in Missouri because courts broadly define legal negligence and
often include breach of fiduciary duties within the definition of negligence. In
Cain v. Hershewe, the Southern District Court of Appeals resorted to a
dictionary to define legal negligence as "any professional misconduct or
unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional and fiduciary duties by an
attorney."' ' In Cooper v. Simon, the Western District Court of Appeals stated
that, in representing a client, an attorney "impliedly represented to his client that
he will exhibit the skill and diligence ordinarily possessed and employed by
well-informed members of the legal profession."'  Courts frequently look to
Rule 4 of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct47 for guidance in
determining the duty an attorney owes a client. The court in Greening v.
Klamen, however, held that breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct, alone,
did not form a basis for a cause of action in legal malpractice.48 Except in cases
in which an attorney admits he or she was negligent and that damages occurred
as a result of the admitted negligence, legal expert testimony is necessary to
prove the standard of care in a legal malpractice case.49
43. "The legal profession will not be unduly burdened by being required to act
competently toward identifiable persons that a client specifically intends to benefit when
such persons have no other viable remedy and where such persons are not in an
adversarial relationship to the client." Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C.,
900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995).
44. The six factors are: (1) the existence of a specific intent by the client that the
purpose of the attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of
the harm to the plaintiff as a result of the attorney's negligence; (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff will suffer injury from the attorney's misconduct; (4) the
closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the injury; (5) the policy
of preventing future harm; and (6) the burden of the profession of recognizing liability
under the circumstances. Id.
45. 760 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
864 (5th ed. 1979)).
46. 719 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
47. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4 (1997). See Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."). See also
Rule 1.4(a) ("A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."); Rule 1.4(b) ("A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
48. 652 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
49. Bross v. Denny, 791 S.W.2d 416,421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Cooper v. Simon,
719 S.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
1998]
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The third element, proximate cause, is critical in establishing legal
malpractice. "The plaintiff, of course, must show a sufficient causal connection
between the wrongful act and the alleged damages in order to be entitled to
submit the alleged damage to the jury."5 In Lange v. Marshall, for example, the
appellate court reversed judgment for plaintiff on her suit for attorney
malpractice resulting from a divorce settlement because she failed to establish
any damages caused by her attorney's alleged malpractice.5 ' The plaintiff
claimed that when the attorney jointly represented the plaintiff and her husband
in negotiating a property settlement, he was negligent in failing to advise her of
her marital and property rights.52 She claimed to have incurred extra expense in
hiring a second attorney to achieve the property settlement she considered
adequate. 3 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to show proximate cause
because, even if the attorney had done what the plaintiff alleged he should have,
the plaintiff failed to establish that she would not have incurred the expenses she
did in achieving her final settlement.54
The fourth element of legal malpractice is most often proven by establishing
the legal viability of the plaintiff's underlying claim, the "case within the case."5
Before a plaintiff can recover, he or she must prove that the original action had
merit and would have been successful but for the attorney's negligence. 6 In
Bross v. Denny, the plaintiff had to plead and prove that her underlying claim for
a portion of her husband's military retirement benefits in a divorce settlement
would have been successful if her attorney had not negligently failed to
anticipate passage of pending federal legislation.57 Plaintiffs expert attorney
witnesses testified that passage of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (USFSPA),58 effective February 1, 1983, had entitled plaintiff to
a portion of her husband's pension benefits because her divorce settlement was
not final until March 4, 1983."9 The trial court concluded that plaintiff had
proven that she would have prevailed in her divorce settlement if the attorney
had not been negligent. She succeeded in proving the legal validity of her "case
within a case."6
50. Williams v. Preman, 911 S.W.2d 288, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). See also Cain
v. Hershewe, 760 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("To recover for legal
malpractice, a plaintiff must establish a lawyer's negligence, some loss or injury, and a
causal connection between the negligence and the loss.").
51. 622 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
52. Id. at 238.
53. Id. at 239.
54. Id.
55. Hanna, supra note 2, at 98.
56. Boatright v. Shaw, 804 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
57. 791 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
58. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West 1983).
59. Bross, 791 S.W.2d at 418-19.
60. Id. at 421.
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The requirement to establish the "case within a case," which arises in both
civil and criminal cases, may offer the best defense available to an attorney
charged with malpractice. If the attorney can establish that the claimant would
not have been successful on the underlying claim, no matter how flagrant the
attorney's negligence or wrong may have been, recovery may be denied.61 A
defendant attorney, however, cannot offer the mere existence of a settlement in
a civil suit as evidence that the underlying claim would have been unsuccessful
but for the attorney's negligence.62 As the court in Williams v. Preman
concluded, a settlement does not inevitably defeat the claim for damages in a
malpractice suit.63 In this case, Williams hired an attorney, Preman, to represent
him in a bankruptcy." When a creditor alleged that Williams had intentionally
concealed assets and filed an objection to discharge, Williams hired a new
attorney and settled with the creditor.6 Williams then brought suit against
Preman, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and claimed
damages, including additional attorney fees and expenses.66 Although the court
did not find that Williams had made a submissible case on causation as to the
inclusion of the settlement in the damages he claimed, the court did not rule out
that an adequate showing of a justified settlement could be passed on to a
defendant.67
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Five elements are necessary to establish the existence of a fiduciary duty in
Missouri: (1) one party must be subservient to the dominant mind and will of the
other as a result of age, state of health, illiteracy, mental disability, or ignorance;
(2) the dominant party must possess or manage the subservient person's
business, land, monies, or other things of value; (3) the subservient party must
surrender independence to the dominant party; (4) the dominant party must
habitually manipulate the actions of the subservient party; and (5) the subservient
party must place trust and confidence in the dominant party.68 Among
relationships held to be fiduciary relationships are those between trustees and
beneficiaries, guardians and their wards, agents and principals, and attorneys and
clients.69
61. Brown v. Adams, 715 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
62. Williams v. Preman, 911 S.W.2d 288, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 292.
65. Id. at 293.
66. Id. at 294.
67. Id.
68. Chmieleski v. City Prod. Corp., 660 S.W.2d 275, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959).
1998]
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A 1950 Missouri Supreme Court case, Gardine v. Cottey, recognized that
an attorney has a fiduciary relationship with a client and established the parallel
between breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.7" The Gardine court
found that an attorney must represent, advise, and protect a client's interests to
the exclusion of others' or be held liable for perpetrating a fraud upon the
client.7 In Gardine, the attorney represented both parties in a divorce action.72
The attorney persuaded the wife to sign a property settlement he knew was
unfavorable to her.73 Reasoning that "sound public policy requires an attorney
to not represent conflicting interests,"'74 the court held that the settlement was
fraudulently procured by the attorney by collusive conduct and was void and
unenforceable."'75 To define the fiduciary duty of protecting the client's interest,
the court cited Laughlin v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, which
provided:
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary and of very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring very high degree of
fidelity and good faith on attorney's part .... An attomey must faithfully,
honestly and consistently represent the interests, and protect the rights, of his
client. He is bound to discharge his duties to his client with the strictest
fidelity, to serve the highest and utmost good faith towards him, and to obey
his lawful directions.76
The Gardine court concluded that a breach of fidelity to a client's interest
was constructive fraud.77 Until Klemme v. Best, Missouri courts did not use a
formalized list of elements to establish breach of legal fiduciary duty or
constructive fraud. Instead, courts acknowledged and defined the nature of the
duty and then applied the definition to the facts of the case if the court
70. 230 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Mo. 1950).
71. Id. at 740.
72. Id. at 739.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 740.
75. Id. at 739.
76. 163 S.W.2d 761,765 (Mo. 1942).
77. Gardine, 230 S.W.2d at 739. See also Fiske v. Buder, 125 F.2d 841, 846 (8th
Cir. 1942).
78. See Fiske, 125 F.2d. at 846; Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C.,
900 S.W.2d 624, 629-30 (Mo. 1995); In re Oliver, 285 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Mo. 1956);
Gardine v. Cottey 230 S.W.2d 731, 738-40 (Mo. 1950); Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l
Bank, 163 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. 1942); In re Conrad, 105 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1937);
Williams v. Preman, 911 S.W.2d 288, 300-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Rose v. Summers,
Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Cain v.
Hershewe, 760 S.W.2d. 146, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Shaffer v. Terrydale Management
Corp., 648 S.W.2d 595, 605-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 63
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determined that a duty was owed.79 Damages specifically related to the breach
of fiduciary duty often were not reached because the claim was joined with that
of legal malpractice."
Because breach of fiduciary duty may be the sole claim in a legal
disbarment proceeding, disbarment cases reveal most clearly how Missouri
courts analyze breach of fiduciary duty claims. In In re John R. Oliver, an
attorney was charged with converting and using money from a settlement he
won for a client in a wrongful death suit.8' Oliver represented Jones, whose
husband died in an automobile accident.82 After successfully prosecuting Jones's
claim for the wrongful death of her husband, Oliver deposited the net proceeds
of the $8,000 settlement in his personal checking account and induced Jones to
sign a waiver of her rights to death benefits and a power of attorney to Oliver to
pay claims against her late husband. Referring to the standard for attorney
conduct set forth in Laughlin, " the Oliver court said, "It is well settled that the
nature of a lawyer's profession necessitates the utmost good faith toward his
client and the highest loyalty and devotion to his client's interests."85 Because
Oliver breached this fiduciary duty to Jones by misappropriating her settlement,
Oliver was disbarred.86 .
In a case not involving disbarment, Shaffer v. Terrydale Management
Corp., the Western District Court of Appeals determined that an attorney's
breach of fiduciary duty was distinct from his breach of contractual duties.8
Shaffer, an attorney, drew up a real estate trust as requested by his client,
Gramlich. Shaffer became a minority shareholder in the trust.88 Gramlich had
instructed Shaffer to prepare the trust agreement for Terrydale Management
Corporation (Terrydale) so that the corporation could redeem the stock of any
shareholder who became inactive, 9 thereby keeping the trust a family project."
From 1972, when the trust became active, until 1979, when Shaffer no longer
participated in Terrydale's affairs, Shaffer served in a variety of capacities at
Terrydale, including that of director, officer, counsel, and consultant.9' In 1980,
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
80. Williams, 911 S.W.2d at 295-96; Rose, 887 S.W.2d at 683-86; Cain, 760
S.W.2d at 146-49.
81. 285 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Mo. 1956).
82. Id. at 649.
83. Id. at 649-50.
84. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. In re Oliver, 285 S.W.2d at 655 (citing In re Thomson's Estate, 144 S.W.2d
79, 83 (Mo. 1940)).
86. Id.
87. 648 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
88. Id. at 598.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 598, 600.
91. Id. at 597-98.
1998]
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Gramlich's son informed Shaffer that, because he was no longer employed at
Terrydale, the company was exercising its option vested in the stockholder
agreement to purchase Shaffer's shares.92 Shaffer refused to redeem the stock,
claiming that he did not meet the Internal Revenue Service's definition of
"employee"'93 and that the option in the shareholder agreement applied only
when an employee was terminated.9 Shaffer brought an action for declaratory
judgment to determine Terrydale's right to purchase his shares. 95
The trial court adjudicated Shaffer's claim as a right of contract. 96 The
appellate court reversed the trial court because it erroneously interpreted the
word "employment" in its construction of the shareholder contract and did not
give effect to Shaffer's violation of fiduciary duty to Gramlich.9' In its analysis
of Shaffer's fiduciary duty, the appellate court established that Shaffer had
formulated the stockholders agreement as an attorney for Gramlich and
Terrydale,9' was bound to scrupulous fidelity to Gramlich's cause,99 and was
precluded from any personal advantage from abuse of Gramlich's confidence.'
The court said the very purpose of Shaffer's petition for declaratory judgment
was a violation of his fiduciary duty.' Shaffer's petition sought a vindication
of a claim of right adverse to Gramlich which arose from the trust agreement
Gramlich had entrusted to Shaffer. 2 The court concluded that "[t]he claim by
Shaffer, although based on a culminated contract, is governed not by principles
of contract construction, but by the more exact standard of the duty of a lawyer
to a client."' 3 Because Shaffer and Gramlich had an attorney-client relationship,
the court found that Shaffer was bound not to obtain self-advantage from
subject-matter Gramlich committed to him unless Gramlich knew and consented
to such an advantage.'" Because Gramlich's express intent was to restrict stock
ownership to persons active in participation of the business, 105 and because there
was no evidence that Shaffer had disclosed to Gramlich that the Internal
92. Id. at 599.
93. Id. at 606.
94. Id.
95. Schaffer, 648 S.W.2d at 597.
96. Id. at 599.
97. Id. at 605-06.
98. Id. at 604.
99. Id. at 605.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 604.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 605.
104. Id.
105. Schaffer, 648 S.W.2d at 603.
[Vol. 63
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Revenue Service definition would not pertain to Shaffer,"0 6 the court found that
Shaffer had violated his fiduciary duty to Gramlich. 1°7
The Shaffer decision was significant because it distinguished breach of
fiduciary duty from an attorney's contractual obligations and attributed fiduciary
duty with a "more exacting standard" for attorney conduct.'0 8 By elevating
Shaffer's obligation to meet his fiduciary duty over his obligation to meet
contractual duties,0 9 the court established that attorneys owe clients a duty of
loyalty and confidence in addition to, and as important as, their duty of due care
in providing professional services."0
Although the Shaffer court viewed fiduciary duty as independent of an
attorney's duty to provide professional services, in other cases, breach of
fiduciary duty and legal malpractice claims are joined. In these cases, the two
claims often are analyzed concurrently because the plaintiff's alleged damages
are indivisible. As a result, the distinction between the two claims may blur and
breach of fiduciary duty may seem to be a claim for legal malpractice.
A case in which the two claims seem one, Rose v. Summers, Compton,
Wells & Hamburg, P.C., the Eastern District Court of Appeals based its legal
malpractice analysis on the existence of a duty of loyalty and its constructive
fraud analysis on a relationship of trust and confidence between attorney and
client."' In Rose, three limited partners claimed that the attorney who
represented the limited partnership represented them as individuals and was
liable for malpractice and fraud by failing to ensure that the general partners did
nothing to injure the partnership or the partners." 2 Referring to the first element
of malpractice, the attorney-client relationship,"13 the court then analyzed this
element in terms of the "duty of loyalty,""' 4 words traditionally used to define
fiduciary duty."5 The court stated, "We hold that an attorney representing a
limited partnership owes a duty of loyalty to the limited partnership as an
organization and not to the limited partners as individuals." ' 16 After referring to
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct for support for its position,"7 the court
106. Id. at 607.
107. Id. at 609.
108. Id. at 605.
109. A legal malpractice action is founded on an attorney's duty to exercise
reasonable care orto honor express contract commitments. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d
493,495 (Mo. 1997).
110. Shaffer, 648 S.W.2d at 605-06.
111. 887 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
112. Id. at 684.
113. Id. at 686 (citing Boatright v. Shaw, 804 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990)).
114. Id.
115. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1997).
116. Rose, 887 S.W.2d at 686-87 (emphasis added).
117. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4-1.13 (1993). Rule 4-1.13 provides that a "lawyer
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refused to impose on the attorney a duty of loyalty to partners as individuals
because it would place excessive burdens on attorneys and inevitably expose
them to conflicting interests."1 In dismissing the partners' alternative claim that,
as third parties, they were damaged by the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty,
the court's finding did not distinguish that claim from a malpractice claim: "As
previously stated, this count alleges legal malpractice."" 9 The court then refused
to identify legal malpractice as one of the exceptional claims 2' that made
attorneys liable to third parties.'
In the final part of its decision, the Rose court considered the claim of
constructive fraud against the attorney as a claim separate from breach of
fiduciary duty and malpractice.' The court affirmed dismissal of this claim
because it found no relationship of trust and confidence between the attorney and
plaintiff partners." Injuggling the three causes of action, the Rose court treated
breach of fiduciary duty as a type of malpractice and treated constructive fraud,
a claim usually found synonymous with breach of fiduciary duty, as separate
from malpractice.
The Rose decision epitomized some courts' indecision in classifying breach
of fiduciary duty as either identical to or independent of legal malpractice.
Missouri courts, however, have not been indecisive when defining breach of
fiduciary duty as a failure of loyalty or confidence towards a client. 24 Courts
consistently have found breach of fiduciary duty when an attorney obtained a
personal advantage from the subject matter entrusted by the client 2 ' or when an
attorney was disloyal, placing another's interests over that of the client's.1
26
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its
duly authorized constituents." The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent with this
rule to hold that an attorney had a duty to the officers, directors, employees, and
shareholders and thus to limited partners in a limited partnership who are comparable to
shareholders in a corporation. Rose, 887 S.W.2d at 686.
118. Rose, 887 S.W.2d at 686.
119. Id. at 687.
120. These claims are fraud, collusion, or a malicious or tortious act. Kennedy v.
Kennedy, 819 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
121. Rose, 887 S.W.2d at 687.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra Section III.B.
125. See In re Oliver, 285 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1956); Shaffer v. Terrydale
Management Corp., 648 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See also 2 MALLEN § 14.1
supra note 40.
126. See Gardine v. Coftey, 230 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1950). See also 1 MALLEN,
supra note 40, at 19.
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In Klemme v. Best, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished breach of
legal fiduciary duty and legal malpractice as separate and distinct causes of
action.'27 However, the court held that, if a breach of fiduciary duty depended
on an attorney's malpractice, the claim for malpractice subsumed the claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.'
The court first cited its recent decision in Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson
& Kilroy, P.C., which defined the four elements of a legal malpractice claim. 29
The Klemme court listed these elements as: (1) an attorney-client relationship;
(2) negligence or breach of contract by the defendant; (3) proximate causation
of the plaintiff's damages; and (4) damages to the plaintiff.'30 The court then set
out five elements for breach of fiduciary duty: (1) an attorney-client relationship;
(2) breach of a fiduciary obligation by the attorney; (3) proximate causation; (4)
damages to the client; and (5) no other recognized tort encompasses the facts
alleged.'3 ' The court noted that the second and fifth elements of breach of
fiduciary duty distinguished this claim from a legal malpractice action.' The
court gave as its rationale for the second element the finding in Gardine v.
Cottey that "[a] breach of the standard of care is negligence, and a breach of
fiduciary duty obligation is constructive fraud."'3 The court then attributed the
fifth element of breach of fiduciary duty to its decision in Donahue.'34
In Donahue, two intended recipients of failed testamentary gifts brought a
legal malpractice claim against the attorney of the decedent.'35 In their amended
petition, the plaintiffs asserted two theories of legal malpractice, one of breach
of fiduciary duty and one of breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries.'36
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the breach
of fiduciary duty claim because the plaintiffs and the defendant did not have an
attorney-client relationship that would give rise to the attorney's fiduciary
duty."'37 The court explained that, because the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty
to the decedent was a result of the attorney's negligent performance of
127. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493,496 (Mo. 1997).
128. Id.
129. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo.
1995).
130. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 495.
131. Id. at 496.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496.
135. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo.
1995).
136. Id. at 626. See also supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
137. Donahue, 900 S.W.2d at 629.
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professional services, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was no more than a
claim for attorney malpractice.
138
In clarifying that part of its Donahue decision, the supreme court, in
Klemme, explained that, because the alleged breach of fiduciary duty in Donahue
was dependent upon attorney negligence, this breach was subsumed by the
action for attorney malpractice. 39 The court then clearly stated that Donahue did
not "preclude an action for breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud where
the alleged breach [was] independent of any legal malpractice."'40
Emphatically stating that clients may sue their attorneys for torts other than
legal malpractice,"'' the court used the opportunity presented in Klemme v. Best
to correct two lower court findings that would be barriers to such suits. The first
barrier, relating to when a breach of fiduciary duty can occur, was erected in the
Western District Court of Appeals' misinterpretation of Donahue in Williams v.
Preman42 Citing Donahue, the Williams court found that when an attorney
breached his or her fiduciary duty to a client during the course of representation,
the breach was legal malpractice, but when the breach occurred outside the time
frame of the representation, it was a breach of fiduciary duty.'43 The Klemme
court overruled this interpretation of Donahue, stating that clients may sue their
attorneys for torts other than legal malpractice and that a breach of fiduciary duty
can occur at any time during the attorney-client relationship.'"
The second barrier to suits against attorneys attacked by the court was that
regarding attorneys' intent. The court corrected the false finding in Arana v.
Koerner 45 that an attorney had to intentionally commit an act of misconduct in
representing a client's interests to give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.'46
"Proof of an attorney's intent is not required to establish breach of fiduciary duty
or constructive fraud.'
14 7
The court concluded that Klemme had alleged facts which constituted a
claim that Best had breached his fiduciary duty to Klemme. 48 Listing each
element of the breach, the court found Klemme had an attorney-client
relationship; 49 that Best had breached his fiduciary obligation by placing the
138. Id.
139. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Williams v. Preman, 911 S.W.2d 288, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), overruled by
Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1997).
143. Id.
144. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496.
145. 735 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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interests of the city of Columbia and its self-insured association above his;'50 that
Best's breach proximately caused Klemme's damages;' 5 ' and that no other
recognized tort encompassed Klemme's claim.'
Although Klemme had argued that his claim for breach of fiduciary duty
was governed by Missouri Revised Statutes § 516.120(5), which allows a claim
of fraud to run upon "the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten
years, of the facts constituting fraud,'' 5 the court refused to apply this statute of
limitations to Klemme's claim.'" Acknowledging its duty to apply the plain and
ordinary meaning to terms in a statute, 5 1 the court said that "fraud" in Section
516.120(5) did not mean "constructive fraud" and that the language in Missouri
Revised Statutes § 516.120(4) applied to claims of breach of fiduciary duty or
constructive fraud.5 6 The court traced the moment when Klemme could have
discovered Best's breach to February 1987, when Klemme retained separate
counsel after he learned that Best was settling the federal suit and intended to
include Klemme as a released party.17 Acknowledging that Klemme could have
discovered that Best had not sought Klemme's removal from the federal suit in
February 1987, the court concluded that the five-year limitation under Section
516.120(4) began to run from that date.' Because Klemme did not bring his
claim for breach of fiduciary duty or constructive fraud against Best until
September 19, 1994,'5 9 over seven years after the breach was objectively capable
of ascertainment, the court held that Klemme's claim was barred and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. 60
V. COMMENT
Missouri courts routinely have identified fiduciary duty as a distinct
obligation of loyalty and confidentiality an attorney owes a client.'6 ' And, just
as routinely, courts have classified breach of fiduciary duty as a form of legal
malpractice and as an independent cause of action.' 62 Close identification and
150. Id. at 495.
151. Id. at 496.
152. Id.
153. Mo. REv. STAT. 516.120(5) (1994).
154. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 497.
155. Id.
156. Id. See also Koester v. American Republic Invs., Inc., 11 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
1993).
157. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 497.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 495.
160. Id. at 498.
161. See supra Section III.B.
162. See Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 683
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Cain v. Hershewe, 760 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). See also
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even intermingling of the two claims continued until the Williams v. Preman'6'
and Klemme v. Best" courts interpreted the Missouri Supreme Court's holding
in Donahue to mean that breach of fiduciary duty was no more than a claim for
legal malpractice. To correct this misconception, the supreme court set out the
separate elements of each cause of action. However, when the court stated that
breach of fiduciary duty was distinguished from legal malpractice by its second
element (breach of a fiduciary obligation, as opposed to negligence) and fifth
element (no other recognized tort encompasses the facts alleged), the court
created the apparent contradiction that breach of fiduciary obligation did not
violate the standard of conduct an attorney owes a client.
Acknowledging that courts struggle with the close and often blurred
relationship between legal malpractice based on negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty, Ronald E. Mallen and Jeffrey M. Smith in their treatise, Legal
Malpractice, fashioned a conceptual distinction that allows the claim of
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty to co-exist under the umbrella of legal
malpractice.1 6s In Legal Malpractice, an authority cited by the supreme court in
Klemme,'" the authors describe this conceptual model:
The breach of fiduciary obligations, sometimes characterized as
"constructive fraud," is an action in tort, not contract. The tort is a wrong that
is distinct and independent from professional negligence but still is legal
malpractice. One definitional approach is to include the fiduciary obligations
within the standard of care. Although the attorney-client relationship imposes
fiduciary obligations, negligent conduct alone does not implicate a breach of
those obligations. The lawyer may have acted with undivided loyalty and
preserved the client's confidences.
A better approach, is to define the fiduciary obligations as setting a
standard of "conduct," as distinguished from the standard of "care," which
pertains to the requisite skill and knowledge. Thus, negligence concerns the
standard of care, and a breach of loyalty or confidentiality concerns the
standard of conduct. The essence of this approach is to use the model for
negligence, substituting the particular fiduciary obligations for the duty of
care. Thereby, rules of causation, damages, and the burden of proof remain
the same. 67
supra Section III.
163. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
164. Klemme v. Best, No. WD51053, 1996 WL 93540, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar.
5, 1996).
165. See I MALLEN, supra note 40, at 18.
166. The Klemme court cited Section 14.1 in Mallen's and Smith's treatise for a
definition of fiduciary obligations as undivided loyalty and confidentiality. Klemme v.
Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. 1997).
167. 1 MALLEN, supra note 40, at 18.
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Although Smith and Mallen recognize that some courts distinguish breach
of fiduciary obligations from legal malpractice, the authors justify their model
as the prevailing and better reasoned view because "legal malpractice
encompasses any professional misconduct whether attributable to a breach of the
standard of care or of the fiduciary obligations.' ' 68 Their model, used as an
analytical infrastructure, would hold attorneys in an action for malpractice to the
two distinct duties which govern an attorney's relationship to a client: the duty
of loyalty which is a duty of conduct; and the duty to use professional legal skills
and knowledge, a duty of care.169
The Klemme court found that Best violated his fiduciary duty to Klemme
because he placed the interests of the City of Columbia and its self-insured
association above those of Klemme.170 Although the court did not reach whether
Best also committed legal malpractice when it stated that breach of fiduciary
duty independent of malpractice is a separate cause of action, the court implied
that Best had not committed legal malpractice.' But if negligence is the
foundation of legal malpractice, and negligence is a failure to use the requisite
legal skills and knowledge in representing a client,' Klemme committed
malpractice.
A careful analysis of the facts in Klemme reveals that Best failed to use both
factual and professional knowledge in representing Klemme. Best knew the
official investigation showed that Klemme should not have been a named
defendant.7 7 Best told opposing counsel that another named defendant, Otto
Earnhart, had not participated in the Linzie shooting and, as a result of this
representation, Earnhart's name disappeared from the final complaint.174 Best
also knew that he represented Klemme individually77 and should have known
that he owed Klemme the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 76 Even if the court defined
"knowledge" as technical knowledge of the law, this definition would
encompass knowledge of an attorney's fiduciary duty to his client. If Best failed
to exercise his legal knowledge of the facts of the case and his knowledge of his
professional duty of loyalty to Klemme, Best not only breached his fiduciary
duty to Klemme, he was negligent and, using the court's own conceptual model,
committed legal malpractice. Because knowledge of the duty of loyalty is legal
168. 1 MALLEN, supra note 40, at 4.
169. Mallen and Smith define the attorney's duty of care as one exercising the skill
and knowledge ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances. 2
MALLEN, supra note 40, at 550.
170. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
171. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493,496 (Mo. 1997).
172. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
175. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 495.
176. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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knowledge, it follows that breach of fiduciary duty is failure to exercise "due
care," i.e., negligence.
Although negligence and breach of fiduciary duty thus can be conceptually
merged, this convergence is not satisfactory because an attorney can be negligent
without breaching his fiduciary duty to a client. In Mallen and Smith's words,
"Although the attorney-client relationship imposes fiduciary obligations,
negligent conduct alone does not implicate a breach of those obligations. The
lawyer may have acted with undivided loyalty and preserved his client's
confidences."'" Mallen and Smith thus addressed the apparent need to keep the
two causes of action distinct by creating a dichotomy of breach of the "duty of
care" and of the "duty of conduct" as two forms of legal malpractice.
Although, in setting out the elements of fiduciary duty, the Klemme court
adopted Mallen's and Smith's suggested structure (i.e., substituting breach of
fiduciary duty for negligence but using the same rules of causation, damages and
burden of proof), the Klemme court did not recognize breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence as separate causes of action for legal malpractice.' One
explanation is that the court's interpretation of the element of damages for each
cause of action, although identically worded, differed conceptually. When the
Klemme court listed the elements of legal malpractice, it stated that damages
were "damages to the plaintiff' and cited its decision in Donahue.79 But the
element of damages in legal malpractice, as recited in Donahue, was: "but for
the defendant's conduct the plaintiffs would have been successful in prosecution
of their [underlying] claim."'80 The Klemme court's description of damages in
legal malpractice could have been merely an abbreviation of the "case within a
case" wording in Donahue and not a change in meaning. Although the court
concluded that Klemme had suffered damages due to Best's conduct, the court
did not describe those damages or discuss whether Klemme had been held to the
"case within a case" legal malpractice standard of proof.
By using identical language in Klemme to describe damages for both breach
of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice, the court created the following three
possible interpretations: the plaintiff in a breach of fiduciary duty or legal
malpractice claim need only demonstrate damages; or the plaintiff must meet the
"case within a case"standard of proof for both causes of action; or the plaintiff
with a legal malpractice claim must prove the "case within a case" while the
plaintiff with a breach of fiduciary duty claim need only show damages.
Because many claims for breach of fiduciary duty are heard within the
context of disbarment proceedings against attorneys' or in conjunction with
177. 1 MALLEN, supra note 40, at 18.
178. Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496.
179. Id. at 495.
180. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo.
1995).
181. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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other claims, including that of negligence," courts frequently do not analyze
damages resulting only from breach of fiduciary duty. In Williams v. Preman,
however, the trial and appellate courts subjected the plaintiff's claim of breach
of fiduciary duty against his attorney to the "case within a case" standard of
proof associated with damages in legal malpractice claims.' The supreme court
in Klemme v. Best corrected the Williams court's misinterpretation ofDonahue'84
but did not find error in the court's application of the "case within a case"
standard of proof for damages in this breach of fiduciary duty claim.'85 The
implication that can be drawn from the court's silence is that the standard for
damages in a breach of fiduciary duty is the same as that for negligence: proof
that the underlying claim would have been successful but for the attorney's
breach.
If all elements of breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice due to
negligence, then, are the same except for the underlying nature of the attorney's
action, the utility of the Mallen and Smith model becomes evident. If the
Missouri Supreme Court had adopted this model in Klemme, it would have
provided a conceptually workable definition of legal malpractice as failure by an
attorney to uphold the standard of care (application of skill and knowledge) or
standard of conduct (fiduciary duty) owed to a client. The court also would have
avoided the apparent contradiction inherent in the assertion that breach of an
attorney's fiduciary duty is not negligent conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Klemme v. Best, the Missouri Supreme Court established that a plaintiff
can claim breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney as a separate cause of
action if the breach is not dependent upon a claim for negligence. In setting out
elements for breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice based on negligence,
however, the court reached the unsatisfying result that breach of fiduciary duty
is not negligent conduct by an attorney. An adoption of the model suggested by
Mallen and Smith in their treatise on legal malpractice'86 would avoid this
apparent contradiction. That model provides a more reasoned conceptual
framework for legal malpractice by creating two co-existing subcategories:
breach of the standard of conduct, based on an attorney's duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, and breach of the standard of care based on an attorney's duty
to use requisite legal skill and knowledge in representing a client.
MELISSA A. THOMAS
182. See supra notes 87-127 and accompanying text.
183. 911 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
184. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
185. Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997).
186. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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